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REFORMING PUNISHMENT OF 
FINANCIAL REPORTING FRAUD 
Samuel W. Buell* 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Two obvious questions dominate the many cases of malfeasance in 
corporations and markets that have arrived in the criminal justice 
system during the last five years: Was the behavior at issue criminal?  If 
so, for how long (if it all) should the perpetrators be sent to prison?  
Thorough pursuit of either question involves challenging theoretical 
inquiries.  On the second question (punishment), however, the law 
suffers at a facial level from an embarrassment.  Extant criminal law has 
not come close to working out even the easiest parts of the question of 
how to punish financial reporting fraud.  The United States legal system 
is botching things even as the courts routinely face decisions with grave 
consequences: Should the former chief executive officer of a Fortune 
500 company, whose shareholders lost hundreds of millions when the 
company revealed falsity in its finances, be sent to prison for months, 
years, a decade or even life without parole?1  
My goal is to describe some concrete steps to rationalize the 
process of sentencing corporate offenders in the cases of large-scale 
financial reporting fraud that have been prevalent since 2001.  Even if 
we set aside some heavy normative questions, such as the wisdom of 
imprisonment as a sanction for white-collar offenders, the proper mix of 
deterrent and retributive aims in such cases, and the appropriate 
theoretical methodology for deriving the “optimal” or “just” sentence in 
a given case, at least three accessible problems remain.  First, we need a 
scale for comparing one case to another.  Second, we need a 
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 1 See, e.g., United States v. Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 2d 506 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (sentence of 
forty-two months’ imprisonment for forty-year-old first-time offender in case in which federal 
guidelines appeared to call for sentence of eighty-five years’ imprisonment). 
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methodology for fixing the location of a given case on that scale.  Third, 
even if we are unsure exactly how to calibrate the scale, its contours 
(where it begins and ends and the rate at which it increases) must satisfy 
minimum requirements of rationality.  Current law suffers from serious 
deficits in at least two of these three areas and leaves ample room for 
what ought to be uncontroversial improvement. 
Many of the law’s failings in this area are due to lack of 
understanding and foresight of the special (but now ubiquitous) fraud 
case involving accounting falsehood perpetrated on a large, liquid 
market for investment in a public company.  In recent years, sentencing 
guidelines projects, in spite of their many flaws, have made significant 
strides in working out methods to measure and compare many common 
criminal cases, from narcotics to weapons to theft offenses.  However, 
guidelines methods developed to date—particularly those commonly 
used for economic offenses—do not easily translate to the offense of 
financial reporting fraud in large public companies whose securities are 
traded on liquid markets.  This crime, it turns out, is qualitatively 
different (not just larger) than ordinary fraud.  The motives, the identity 
of the victim, the manner in which the victim is harmed and the gain to 
the offender all look different.  Failing to account for these differences 
can result in errors of measurement that produce inequity and 
irrationality in sentencing. 
These deficiencies in sentencing law are unavoidable in 
confronting the problem that motivates this Symposium.  In a federal 
system of policing and punishing financial fraud, concerns include that 
uncoordinated actions of multiple sanctioning authorities could lead to 
over-sanctioning of fraud, resulting in over-deterrence and unjust 
punishment.  Additionally, lack of coordination could lead to discord 
and confusion in the expressive effects of punishing white-collar crime.  
These concerns cannot be addressed in the absence of rough consensus 
across jurisdictions, around a focal point in law, about scale and 
methodology for measuring and aligning a given group of cases eligible 
for punishment. 
My inquiry requires some working assumptions, which are 
contestable of course, but sufficiently track prevailing political and legal 
consensus as to be necessary to any practical effort to achieve reform of 
sentencing law.  I assume that some major cases of financial fraud are 
punished criminally, in service of a mix of deterrent and retributive 
aims.2  I assume that punishments in serious fraud cases that do not 
include some imprisonment trivialize the conduct, undermining 
deterrent and expressive effects of criminalizing fraud and offending 
 
 2 I have written elsewhere about how we determine which cases to treat criminally.  See 
Samuel W. Buell, Novel Criminal Fraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971 (2006). 
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values related to equal treatment of individuals in the criminal process 
without regard to socio-economic status.  I assume that proportionality 
is a requirement across all major white-collar cases; like cases should be 
treated alike, different cases should be treated differently and criminal 
sentences should not vary substantially according to nonrelevant factors 
(such as the location of prosecution, identity of sentencing judge, or 
heat of public emotion).  Finally, I assume that the federal government 
continues to investigate, prosecute and punish many major fraud cases.  
Thus, federal law provides a focal point for both public consciousness 
about white collar crime and policy deliberations of other jurisdictions. 
In addition to working from these assumptions, I will bracket plea 
bargaining.  Indisputably, plea bargaining has a greater impact on 
disparities in sentencing than do lack of principle or clarity in 
sentencing law or variations among the practices of sentencing judges.  
Plea bargaining exerts enormous influence over punishment in 
individual cases (to take one common example, by capping a 
defendant’s sentence through a plea to a single count with a small 
statutory maximum).  It also controls the disposition of nearly all 
criminal cases.  The influence of plea bargaining on sentences for 
financial reporting fraud, however, is no reason to ignore deficits in the 
positive law that otherwise controls punishment (and in the shadow of 
which prosecutors and defendants may bargain).3  While the subject of 
plea bargaining is at least of equal importance, it is beyond the scope of 
this Symposium contribution. 
My inquiry will describe federal sentencing law and how it should 
be improved as to each of the three requirements that concern me (i.e., a 
scale, a methodology for placing cases on the scale and calibration of 
the scale).  In Part I, I will supply a hypothetical case that will assist my 
analysis.  In Part II, I will describe the best available scale for 
measuring cases of financial fraud; here, present law is closest to what I 
recommend.  In Part III, I will describe the best available methodology 
for fixing cases on the scale; present law here is deficient and fractured.  
In Part IV, I will consider how to calibrate the scale; here, present law 
urgently needs major revision.  In Part V, I will briefly discuss 
procedural avenues for changing sentencing law in the desirable 
direction. 
Let me preview my conclusions.  Monetary loss to victims is the 
best available scale for comparing cases of financial reporting fraud and 
the United States Sentencing Guidelines are the best available 
coordination device for applying that scale across cases.4  The best of 
 
 3 But see William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 
117 HARV. L. REV. 2548 (2004). 
 4 The Guidelines used to be binding but are now advisory.  See United States v. Booker, 543 
U.S. 220, 245 (2005).  Nonetheless, they remain a focal point for sentencing and judges are still 
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many methodologies for measuring loss to victims (some so complex as 
to be unworkable) compares a company’s average share price during the 
fraud with its average share price in the ninety days following the 
fraud’s revelation.  It further excludes periods during which significant 
events unrelated to the fraud moved the share price and adjusts for the 
stock’s historical relationship to movements in the market.  The existing 
scale in the Guidelines must be both compressed (it escalates too fast) 
and shifted downward (the high end of the scale which can result in 
sentences of life imprisonment without parole would be laughable if it 
were not operational law of punishment).  Some Guidelines provisions 
that double-count for relevant factors must be eliminated.  Finally, in a 
hierarchy of means for reform, congressional correction of the 
Guidelines would be best but is least likely; Sentencing Commission 
revision of the Guidelines is easily achievable and would be authorized; 
and judicial modification of the rules is least desirable but authorized 
and necessary in the absence of (or pending) congressional or 
Sentencing Commission action. 
 
I.     HYPOTHETICAL 
 
Consider an admittedly oversimplified hypothetical that 
exemplifies the sentencing problem presented by recent cases of 
reporting fraud in public corporations.  Suppose that Acme 
Corporation’s stock is traded on the NYSE and is among the S&P 500.  
Acme has been a public company for more than ten years.  Through 
numerous divisions and subsidiaries, it manufactures and sells 
telecommunications products.  CEO was the Chief Executive Officer of 
Acme.  COO was the Chief Operating Officer.  CFO was the Chief 
Financial Officer.  CAO was the Chief Accounting Officer.  CON was 
the Controller.   
The following events occurred at Acme between 2002 and the 
middle of 2006: 
 
• 2002 through 2004: Acme greatly expanded its operations, 
acquiring businesses and assets, adding new divisions, 
issuing new equity, increasing debt and employing a 
variety of complex financing arrangements.  Acme’s stock 
steadily rose in value, suffering no major decline between 
2002 and the end of 2004.  On January 1, 2002, Acme’s 
stock traded at thirty dollars per share with ten million 
 
required to conduct a Guidelines calculation in any sentencing analysis.  See, e.g., United States 
v. Reinhart, 442 F.3d 857, 864 (5th Cir. 2006). 
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shares outstanding.  On January 1, 2005, the stock traded at 
fifty dollars per share, with twenty million shares 
outstanding. 
 
• January 2, 2005: COO, CFO and CAO met to discuss 
company operations.  Wall Street analysts were predicting 
a great first quarter 2005 for Acme, with steadily 
increasing earnings growth.  COO reported that he had just 
learned from company engineers that a system Acme had 
been touting for two years as a prime growth business—a 
means of live video broadcasting to cell phones—would 
require an additional cash expenditure of $500 million to 
be operational on schedule. 
 
There was more bad news.  CFO reported that a bank 
acting as the outside investor in PSHIP LLP, a partnership 
created by Acme to raise funds through borrowing while 
keeping debt off Acme’s balance sheet, informed him that 
it would invoke a contractual provision that, according to 
the bank, allowed the bank to redeem its equity in PSHIP 
LLP and withdraw from the partnership.  Acme, CFO said, 
would be forced to consolidate PSHIP LLP on its own 
balance sheet if it could not locate a substitute investor, 
which seemed unlikely.  PSHIP LLP was carrying $500 
million in debt.  COO and CFO said CEO would fire all 
three of them if Acme’s stock declined upon announcement 
of its first quarter results. 
 
CAO suggested a plan to avoid this.  CAO explained that 
they could tell the bank that Acme would immediately 
repurchase the bank’s equity stake in PSHIP LLP, as long 
as the bank allowed Acme to keep the bank as an equity 
partner “on paper.”  Then, CAO explained, they could 
borrow an additional $500 million through PSHIP LLP to 
maintain funding for Acme’s cell phone venture.  CAO 
said, “I’ll handle the auditors.”  The three agreed to 
implement CAO’s plan and then did so.  CAO lied to 
Acme’s outside auditor about the bank’s continued equity 
position in PSHIP LLP and the auditors did not seek 
verification from the bank. 
 
• April 1, 2005: Acme reported strong first quarter earnings, 
consistent with Wall Street expectations. 
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• April 1 to June 1, 2005: Acme’s stock continued to rise 
through the second quarter, reaching sixty dollars per share 
on June 1, 2005. 
 
• June 15, 2005: CON discovered documents revealing 
CAO’s scheme.  CON forwarded the documents to CEO.  
An alarmed CEO consulted Acme’s outside counsel at the 
law firm of Attorney & Lawyer. 
 
• June 30, 2005: After a brief investigation, Attorney & 
Lawyer recommended that CEO immediately disclose the 
accounting violations and record any necessary charges and 
corrections to Acme’s reported earnings and balance sheet. 
 
• July 1, 2005: CEO conducted a conference call with 
investors and analysts to discuss Acme’s second quarter 
results.  During the call, CEO publicly reported that PSHIP 
LLP had been improperly deconsolidated in Acme’s first 
quarter’s results; that Acme would file a restatement of first 
quarter results with the SEC; that the company would 
increase recorded debt by one billion dollars; and that 
Acme could no longer predict when its new cell phone 
venture would be operational.  Standard & Poor’s 
immediately downgraded Acme’s credit rating from A+ to 
B+. 
 
• July 1 to July 6, 2005: Acme’s stock declined sharply, from 
sixty to twenty dollars. 
 
• July 6 to December 31, 2005: Acme’s stock further 
declined steadily, from twenty to ten dollars.  (Assume that 
the S&P 500 was flat during this time.) 
 
• January 1 to July 1, 2006: Acme’s stock rallied to twenty 
dollars per share.  (Again, assume the S&P 500 remained 
flat.) 
 
Suppose that COO, CFO and CAO stand before the district court 
for sentencing.  Each was convicted of many counts of securities fraud, 
meaning that the maximum statutory exposure is decades of 
imprisonment.5  The salient features of the Acme hypothetical are 
summarized below: 
 
 5 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (2006) (twenty-five-year maximum per count). 
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II.     A SCALE FOR MEASURING CASES 
 
The major premise of the sentencing reform movement of the last 
thirty years holds that proportionality and equality require systematic 
efforts to treat like cases alike and different cases differently.6  The 
empirical conclusion that gave birth to the Guidelines was that relying 
 
 6 See Susan R. Klein & Jordan M. Steiker, The Search for Equality in Criminal Sentencing, 
2002 SUP. CT. REV. 223, 229-34. 
 
DATE EVENT SHARE PRICE 
 
SHARES 
 
January 1, 2002 
 
None 
 
$30 
 
10,000,000 
 
January 1, 2005 
 
Three years of successful 
operations 
 
$50 
 
20,000,000 
 
January 2, 2005 
 
COO, CFO and CAO 
learn of problems and 
plan accounting fraud 
 
$50 
 
20,000,000 
 
April 1, 2005 
 
Increased first quarter 
earnings announced 
 
$55 
 
20,000,000 
 
June 15, 2005 
 
CEO learns of accounting 
fraud and investigates 
 
$58 
 
20,000,000 
 
July 1, 2005 
 
Accounting fraud 
disclosed; debt increased 
one billion dollars; cell 
phone venture on hold; 
rating agencies 
downgrade 
 
$60 
 
20,000,000 
 
July 6, 2005 
 
Decline in share price 
slows 
 
$20 
 
20,000,000 
 
December 31, 
2005 
 
Decline in share price 
concludes 
 
$10 
 
20,000,000 
 
July 1, 2006 
 
Most recent available 
price 
 
$30 
 
20,000,000 
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on the efforts of individual judges to achieve proportionality and 
equality was hopeless.7  Left untethered by law (other than usually 
immaterial statutory maxima), sentencing judges created, through 
accumulated individual punishment decisions, a system amounting to a 
lottery.  The length of a defendant’s sentence depended as much on 
where (Boston or Birmingham?) and before whom (Johnson or Reagan 
appointee?) a defendant stood than on relevant factors such as the 
degree of planning or harm involved in the offense.8  White-collar 
sentences especially displayed this pathology before the advent of the 
United States Sentencing Guidelines.9 
Whatever one thinks about the success or failure of the Guidelines 
in addressing this concern, it is hard to argue with the project’s mission, 
at least in original form.  We ought to punish criminal behavior 
according to what motivates us to criminalize that behavior.  The choice 
to have a program of sending people to prison for offenses against 
society is, after all, a policy choice taken by society as a whole.  Society 
has a powerful interest in seeing that the project is carried out in 
keeping with its purposes.  Nothing in the motivating purposes of the 
project of criminal prohibition involves a desire for chance and 
inconsistency.10 
The rub (some say fatal) in the Guidelines enterprise is how to 
measure crimes with a method that can be used across a series of cases, 
such that one case can be compared to another.11  The Guidelines have 
been an experiment in whether there is a workable middle in measuring 
the seriousness of criminal cases between, for example, saying, “All 
robberies deserve ten years in prison” and saying, “A robbery deserves 
whatever sentence between zero and twenty years in prison the given 
judge in a given case thinks it deserves.”12  
For the crime of fraud, the Guidelines have settled on monetary 
loss to victims as the relevant middle position.  Here, I will embrace 
existing law, arguing that victim loss is generally the correct guiding 
principle for measuring the seriousness of financial reporting fraud.  It 
is important to understand what leads to this conclusion and to evaluate 
some alternatives. 
Start with the current federal Guidelines.  In the most recent 
 
 7 See id. 
 8 See id. 
 9 Compare, e.g., United States v. Bergman, 416 F. Supp. 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (sentence of 
four months’ imprisonment for multi-million-dollar nursing home fraud), with Browder v. United 
States, 398 F. Supp. 1042 (D. Or. 1975) (sentence of twenty-five years’ imprisonment for 
pledging $500,000 of stolen securities). 
 10 See Klein & Steiker, supra note 6, at 224-25. 
 11 See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less 
Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901, 918-24 (1991). 
 12 See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 328-40 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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version, they begin with a “base offense level” of seven in any case of 
securities fraud.13  The Guidelines then add from zero to thirty levels, 
depending on the amount of loss.14  The loss table, which applies to 
every case of fraud and theft, as well as nearly all other economic 
crimes, rises this way: 
 
LOSS 
 
LEVEL INCREASE 
≤ $5,000 0 
> $5,000 2 
> $10,000 4 
> $30,000 6 
> $70,000 8 
> $120,000 10 
> $200,000 12 
> $400,000 14 
> $1,000,000 16 
> $2,500,000 18 
> $7,000,000 20 
> $20,000,000 22 
> $50,000,000 24 
> $100,000,000 26 
> $200,000,000 28 
> $400,000,000 30 
 
As I will discuss in Part IV, factors in addition to dollar loss can 
greatly affect a Guidelines sentence in a major fraud case.  But dollar 
loss is the dominant factor.  The loss table can add anything from zero 
to thirty points to a defendant’s total offense level.  The sentencing table 
(the Guidelines’ bottom-line chart for calculating sentences) tops off at 
level 43 (which calls for life without parole).15  Controlling for other 
factors, the difference in prison time between the addition of zero or 
thirty points (the full range of the loss table) can be as much as thirty 
years’ incarceration. 
The Guidelines’ sentencing table is an accelerating scale.  At the 
low end, two levels add about six months to a prison sentence; ten 
levels add about three years.  At the high end of the Guidelines scale, 
two levels add about five years to a prison sentence; the addition of ten 
levels can add sixteen years or more, or even push a sentence to life 
without parole.  In our Acme example, however one ends up measuring 
loss (more on that in Part III), COO, CFO and CAO face long increases 
in their prison sentences because their accounting fraud resulted in large 
 
 13 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(a)(1) (2005). 
 14 Id. § 2B1.1(b)(1). 
 15 Id.  app. § 5A.  Sentencing Table. 
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monetary loss to investors. 
The Sentencing Commission explains that “loss is the greater of 
actual loss or intended loss.”16  “Actual loss” is defined as “the 
reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm that resulted from the 
offense.”17  Pecuniary harm is “reasonably foreseeable” if the defendant 
“knew or, under the circumstances, reasonably should have known, 
[that it] was a potential result of the offense.”18  “Intended loss” is 
intended “pecuniary harm,” even if such harm was unlikely to occur.19 
In a case of accounting fraud in a public company like our Acme 
example, actual loss is likely to control at sentencing since it is often too 
difficult to identify the loss to victims that was “intended” by a 
corporate executive who manipulated financial results in order to obtain 
prestige, job security, compensation, personal portfolio gains and so 
on.20  Put differently, even if we held a strong preference for measuring 
offense seriousness by intended loss (because we believed that 
blameworthiness corresponds to culpable of mental state, not fortuity of 
harm caused), we would be hard-pressed to adhere to that position in a 
case of accounting fraud in a public market.  Furthermore, the 
Sentencing Commission has decided that gain resulting from the 
offense is only to be used if the loss “reasonably cannot be 
determined.”21 
That any systematic effort to compare one financial crime to 
another would settle on a monetary measure is almost too obvious to 
need exploration.22  We care about fraud because it involves the 
wrongful deprivation of a person’s economic interests.  To measure its 
gravity, we would have to start with the question how much economic 
deprivation the perpetrator sought or achieved.  Cheating someone out 
of a dollar is not cheating someone out of her life savings.  As 
important, a monetary measure has universality and liquidity, allowing 
comparison of large numbers of cases across many jurisdictions 
involving an infinite variety of transactions. 
How much one likes loss as the relevant monetary measure 
depends somewhat on how one comes out on the mix of deterrent and 
retributive objectives for punishing white collar crime.  For a purely 
 
 16 Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A). 
 17 Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(i) (emphasis added). 
 18 Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(iv). 
 19 Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(ii). 
 20 It is also difficult to determine what the “reasonably foreseeable” results of revelation of 
accounting manipulation might be on a company’s stock price given the unpredictability of 
markets.  See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A 
Behavioral Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 135 (2002). 
 21 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(B). 
 22 For exhaustive argument in support of this proposition, see Frank O. Bowman, III, Coping 
With “Loss”: A Re-Examination of Sentencing Federal Economic Crimes Under the Guidelines, 
51 VAND. L. REV. 461, 465, 475-83, 497 (1998). 
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deterrent program, one might prefer using actual or intended gain as the 
monetary measure, on the theory that more punishment will be needed 
to discourage the putative offender who believes he has more to gain.23  
The Guidelines’ choice of loss, however, matches longstanding practice 
in Anglo-American criminal law of measuring the severity of property 
crimes by the value of property involved.24  Exclusive concern with 
actual or intended gain—even if it were possible to quantify such a 
figure in an accounting fraud case—would not correspond sufficiently 
to the persistent retributive motivation behind society’s criminal 
response to property offenses.25 
More problematic, in cases of accounting fraud in publicly traded 
companies, analysis of gain to the offender and loss to the victim does 
not correspond to the kind of gain/loss analysis we might envision in a 
cookie-cutter case of fraud (such as when a perpetrator cheats an 
individual by persuading her to purchase a phony investment device).  
In financial reporting fraud, the relationship between the victim’s loss 
and the offender’s gain is complicated and indirect.  Consider our Acme 
example.  COO, CFO and CAO constructed an accounting fraud in 
order to avoid losing their jobs, a motivation probably connected to 
some mixture of benefits including salary, the performance of stock 
options, stability and security for their families and prestige and future 
career prospects.  Victims who purchased over-valued Acme stock and 
held the stock while it declined following revelation of the fraud lost a 
portion of their individual wealth (perhaps leading in some cases to 
ruin), but in a liquid public market at most only some, and possibly 
none, of those losses ended up in the hands of the perpetrators.  
Employees and others also may have suffered economic damage from 
the effects of the fraud and its revelation on Acme; but none of their 
losses flowed to COO, CFO and CAO. 
Given these complications, we need to consider more particularly 
what motivates the punishment of this form of fraud.  COO, CFO and 
CAO committed an offense that visited economic harm on many people, 
but not in the sense that they took those people’s money.  Rather, as 
public company officers, they criminally breached a duty to manage the 
wealth of others responsibly and for the benefit of those others, not 
themselves.  Their purposeful breach of that responsibility not only 
harmed those who entrusted their wealth to these officers; it also 
damaged the confidence of others not invested in this particular 
enterprise about investing their funds in public equity markets.26  Their 
 
 23 See Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a 
Deterrent, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1232, 1237, 1248 (1985). 
 24 See Bowman, III, supra note 22, at 479. 
 25 See id. at 498-99. 
 26 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Are We Really Getting Tough on White Collar Crime?, 15 FED. 
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offense could impede the flow of capital.27 
If punishing financial reporting fraud is a response to an intentional 
breach of trust by a public company officer, then the seriousness of the 
crime is properly measured by the amount of trust that the officer held 
and violated.  The more investor funds lost or placed at risk, the worse 
the fraud.  At least in cases of financial reporting fraud, stakeholder loss 
is preferable to perpetrator gain among possible monetary measures of 
offense seriousness.  Note one choice we must make here.  The bigger 
the company (in terms of market capitalization), the more punishment 
follows.  We could measure loss on a size-relative rather than absolute 
basis.  But that would require us to depart from our focus on harm to, 
and trust among, investors for some reason other than just leniency—
which is addressed by how we set our scale, as discussed in Part IV. 
We should consider one other option for a monetary measure.  We 
could measure the seriousness of the accounting fraud by the quantity of 
impact on the public company’s financial results.28  In our Acme 
example, we could disregard the information about share price, number 
of shares, and so on, and focus solely on the changes in Acme’s 
reported numbers.  PSHIP LLP should have been consolidated on 
Acme’s financial results for the first quarter of 2005.  The failure to 
consolidate PSHIP LLP caused Acme to underreport its debt by one 
billion dollars.  On this account, COO, CFO and CAO’s offense has the 
seriousness of a one billion dollar accounting fraud relative to other 
accounting frauds.  If the fraud persisted over multiple reporting 
periods, we might multiply the quantity of the misstated accounting 
numbers by the number of periods.  We would have to add one other 
step to this method: Calculate the amount of the reporting correction 
relative to the size of Acme (e.g., the fraud amounted to twenty percent 
of the company’s overall debt load).29 
Some obvious troubles disqualify this approach.  Most 
problematic, in some cases it could remove the principle of materiality 
from the punishment analysis.30  Materiality, after all, is not just a 
 
SENT’G REP. 245, 247 (2003) (arguing that “securities fraud has macro-economic consequences” 
because “the victims are not just the shareholders of [the subject company] but shareholders in all 
other public corporations whose share prices have also been discounted because investors no 
longer trust the credibility of reported financial results”). 
 27 See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 345 (2005) (“The securities statutes seek to 
maintain public confidence in the marketplace.”). 
 28 See Coffee, supra note 26, at 247. 
 29 See also United States v. Grabske, 260 F. Supp. 2d 866, 875 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (suggesting 
that a method such as this one would connect a defendant’s punishment “to his conduct and his 
intent rather than the fortuity of what happens to the price of the stock before or after the fraud is 
disclosed”). 
 30 See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (stating that omitted 
information is material if there is a “substantial likelihood that the disclosure . . . would have been 
viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information 
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minimum requirement for fraud liability.  It is also a relative concept 
about seriousness of fraud.  The more that inaccurate financial data 
matters to investors in their decision whether to buy, sell, or hold a 
security, the more damage that data can cause.  To know how much 
damage could or did result from Acme’s hiding of one billion dollars in 
debt, we need to know how much that data mattered to Acme’s 
investors, not just how large the number was relative to the financial 
misstatements of other public companies.  In determining the 
seriousness of the fraud, it makes little sense to disregard the best 
measure of that data’s impact, that is, the market. 
In addition, a monetary measurement that looks at the company’s 
financial statements easily can miss important and harmful components 
of securities fraud in a public company.  In our example, Acme would 
have failed to meet its target date for its new cell phone venture, which 
was an important contributor to its share price, without placing 
additional debt funding in the improperly deconsolidated partnership, 
PSHIP LLP.  The accounting fraud enabled Acme’s executives to 
continue to tell shareholders that the cell phone venture was on track 
when, in the absence of the fraud, the executives would have had to 
concede that the promising new venture was in trouble.  Raw 
quantification of the accounting correction does not capture this 
component of the fraud.31  Therefore, loss measurable in terms of share 
price is preferable to numbers associated with accounting adjustments 
as a measure of offense seriousness. 
A final aspect of the problem of a scale for measuring cases has 
dominated public discussion about sentencing in recent years.  Should 
application of whatever scale we choose be mandatory in fashioning 
any criminal sentence?  As a matter of constitutional law, the Supreme 
Court has now said a sentencing guideline such as a loss scale cannot be 
mandatory unless a jury makes virtually all the factual findings 
necessary to application of the scale, including the calculation of loss.32 
I will make only two observations on the broader topic of 
sentencing reform, pending discussion in Part IV about how to calibrate 
our scale.  First, in cases of public company accounting fraud, jury 
application of mandatory sentencing guidelines, while avoiding 
constitutional obstacles, would be more fraught with problems than 
perhaps anywhere else in present criminal law.  Under the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines, in a case like our Acme example, a jury would 
 
made available”). 
 31 See United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 127 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[R]evelation of an 
extended period of fraudulent financial statements may cause losses beyond that resulting from 
the restatement of financial circumstances because confidence in management and in even the 
truthful portions of a financial statement will be lost.”). 
 32 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005). 
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have to determine not just whether the government proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt every element of criminal securities fraud but many 
other issues including: how much the victims lost; by what method such 
loss should be calculated; the number of victims involved; whether the 
offense involved “sophisticated means;” whether the offense 
“substantially endangered the solvency or financial security” of a public 
company; whether the defendant was an “organizer or leader” of a 
criminal activity involving five or more persons; whether any victim 
was unusually “vulnerable;” whether the defendant obstructed justice in 
the course of the investigation or prosecution; and so on.33 
Complex white collar crime is already believed to be a serious 
challenge to the jury system.34  Handing virtually the entire sentencing 
process in such cases to the jury would revolutionize trials of corporate 
crime, greatly complicating and lengthening them.35  Of course, juries in 
civil securities fraud cases already confront problems of calculating loss 
for fraud on the market.  However, far fewer civil than criminal cases 
proceed to trial; trials of civil cases do not burden the taxpayer nearly as 
much as criminal trials, in which one and sometimes both sides are 
publicly funded; and there is hardly evidence that civil juries in 
securities cases have been particularly adept at handling disputes over 
loss. 
Second, it may not matter so much whether the scale for measuring 
seriousness of fraud is mandatory.  Early data suggests that even though 
the Supreme Court has ruled that the Sentencing Guidelines are no 
longer binding,36 federal judges have continued to follow them most of 
the time.37  We can only speculate about whether this trend will 
 
 33 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2B1.1(b)(1); 2B1.1 cmt. n.3; 2B1.1(b)(2); 
2B1.1(b)(9); 2B1.1(b)(13)(B); 3B1.1(a); 3A1.1(b)(1); 3C1.1. 
 34 See Pamela H. Bucy, Moral Messengers: Delegating Prosecutorial Power, 59 SMU L. 
REV. 321, 326 (2006). 
 35 See Stephanos Bibas, White-Collar Plea Bargaining and Sentencing After Booker, 47 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 721, 733 (2005) (“Proving fraud-on-the-market losses beyond a reasonable 
doubt may be all but impossible, particularly if sophisticated accounting arguments and 
maneuvers baffle lay jurors.”); see also Douglas A. Berman, Tweaking Booker: Advisory 
Guidelines in the Federal System, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 341, 370-71 (2006) (“[I]n any effort to draft 
[jury-applied] federal guidelines, lawmakers may find it hard to develop a comprehensive and yet 
simplified scheme for a complex federal system, and may also find it challenging to engineer an 
effective balance between firm rules and judicial discretion within any such sentencing 
structure.”).  To be sure, the simpler any guidelines framework is, the more plausible is jury 
application of that framework.  See Frank O. Bowman, III, A Simplified Economic Crime 
Guideline: Model Sentencing Guidelines § 2B1, 18 FED. SENT’G REP. 330, 335 (2006) (arguing 
for simplified loss table for economic crimes that would ease proof of loss before jury at trial). 
However, the more bare-bones is any guidelines framework, the less likely is it to treat like cases 
alike and different cases differently.  
 36 See Booker, 543 U.S. at 245. 
 37 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V. BOOKER ON 
FEDERAL SENTENCING, reprinted in 18 FED. SENT’G REP. 190, 192-93 (2006) (reporting that 
85.9 percent of federal sentences since the Supreme Court’s decision in Booker have been in 
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continue and why it exists.  Plausible explanations include that the 
Guidelines supply a focal point that judges use to reduce a coordination 
problem that contributed, at least in part, to inconsistencies in 
sentencing practices before the Guidelines; that a generation of federal 
judges grew comfortable with the Guidelines during nearly two decades 
of mandatory application; that judges do not want to be seen as 
departing from the Guidelines too frequently, for fear that Congress 
may pass new legislation that comports with the Supreme Court’s 
rulings but revokes some of the judges’ rediscovered sentencing 
discretion;38 and that judges prefer to be detached, in the eyes of 
defendants, the public and even themselves from their sentencing 
decisions, which can inflict heavy damage on human lives. 
Whether or not sentencing guidelines are binding law, principled, 
rational, proportional, and equality-based sentencing decisions are a 
consensus objective of society and within the legal system.  It thus 
matters a great deal that we have a scale for measuring cases and that 
the scale be based upon the best available measure, whether or not 
application of the scale is mandated in an individual case.39  In cases of 
financial statement fraud involving publicly traded companies, the best 
scale—with universal applicability, workability and grounding in the 
purposes of punishment in such cases—is total monetary loss to victims. 
 
III.     A METHODOLOGY FOR PLACING CASES ON THE SCALE 
 
We have now begged the question how to measure loss to victims.  
In a routine case of fraud, this question can be easy.  Suppose a devious 
antique dealer calls upon a naїve elderly person at her home and 
persuades her to sell him a unique chest of drawers—which he knows is 
worth $100,000—by convincing her, through charm, lies and evidence 
of his expertise, that the chest is a cheap imitation worth only $500.  
The victim’s loss (and the offender’s gain) is simply the difference 
between the actual value of the item and what the victim received: 
$99,500.40  Controlling for tangential facts that might alter the calculus 
 
conformance with Guidelines (versus 91.9 percent in period immediately preceding Booker)). 
 38 This prospect is all too familiar for the federal judiciary, following the recent experience 
with the Feeney Amendment to the PROTECT Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401, 117 Stat. 
650, 675 (congressional effort to clamp down on judges’ ability to depart from Guidelines, during 
the pre-Booker period when the Guidelines were mandatory). 
 39 See Douglas A. Berman, Distinguishing Offense Conduct and Offender Characteristics in 
Modern Sentencing Reforms, 58 STAN. L. REV. 277, 291 (2005). 
 40 I assume, of course, that the antique dealer is guilty of criminal fraud, which may be in 
question.  Compare Roald Dahl, Parson’s Pleasure, in KISS KISS 74 (1975) (delightfully 
describing a clear, fictional example of such fraud), with HOME OFFICE, FRAUD LAW REFORM: 
CONSULTATION ON PROPOSALS FOR LEGISLATION 10 (2004), available at 
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(the chest’s sentimental value as a family heirloom, its special utility in 
storing the victim’s sewing materials, the victim’s desire to get the chest 
out of her house and so on), there is no doubt in this simple fraud case 
about either the amount of loss to the victim ($95,500) or, more 
important, the causation relationship between the perpetrator’s fraud 
and the victim’s loss (1:1).  In the accounting fraud case like our Acme 
example, however, the issues of loss amount and causation get thorny.41 
This is where the law governing sentencing of corporate offenders 
has gone astray.  In recent cases of major public company fraud, we 
have seen a confusing array of punishments, including: twenty-five 
years’ imprisonment for an accounting fraud causing over one billion 
dollars in losses at Worldcom;42 twenty years’ imprisonment for a 
several hundred million dollar accounting fraud at Adelphia;43 fifteen 
years’ imprisonment for an accounting fraud causing over $100 million 
in investor losses at Homestore.com;44 fifteen years’ imprisonment for a 
$300 million accounting fraud at American Tissue Inc.;45 ten years’ 
imprisonment for an accounting fraud causing billions of dollars in 
losses at Cendant;46 eight and one-third to twenty years’ imprisonment 
for looting of millions of dollars from Tyco;47 three and one half years’ 
imprisonment for an accounting fraud leading to hundreds of millions in 
losses at Impath;48 probation for an accounting fraud causing $400 
million in losses at Healthsouth;49 seven days’ imprisonment for an 
accounting fraud causing over one billion dollars in losses at 
Healthsouth;50 and, for the accounting fraud in the seminal Enron case, 
twenty-four years’ imprisonment for the former CEO but only six years 
for the former CFO (whose sentence was fixed at ten years under a plea 
agreement but whom a judge nonetheless granted a further reduction for 
cooperation and remorse).51 
 
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk (type “fraud law reform” in search bar and click on the matching 
title noted above on the search results page) (using such a hypothetical in considering how to 
determine whether conduct constitutes fraud). 
 41 See Coffee, supra note 26, at 246. 
 42 See United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 129 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 43 See Roben Farzad, Jail Terms for 2 at Top of Adelphia, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2005, at C1. 
 44 See Former Homestore.com CEO Sentenced to 15 Years for Plan to Inflate Revenues, BNA 
CORP. ACCOUNTABILITY & FRAUD DAILY, Oct. 18, 2006. 
 45 See American Tissue Ex-CEO Sentenced to 15 Years in Prison in Fraud Case, WALL ST. J. 
ONLINE, Sept. 25, 2006. 
 46 See Floyd Norris, Ex-Executive at Cendant is Sentenced to 10 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 
2005, at C2. 
 47 See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Ex-Tyco Officers Get 8 to 25 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2005, 
at A1. 
 48 See United States v. Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 2d 506, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 49 See United States v. McVay, 447 F.3d 1348, 1349 (11th Cir. 2006). 
 50 See United States v. Martin, 455 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2006); see also Kathleen F. Brickey, 
Major Corporate Fraud Prosecutions, March 2002-February 2006 (on file with author) (in-
progress tabulation of results in dozens of cases, some of which have reached sentencing stage).  
 51 See John R. Emshwiller, Skilling Gets 24 Years in Prison, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Oct. 24, 
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To be sure, close analysis of these cases reveals plenty of relevant 
distinctions, including the extent of the frauds, the defendants’ roles, the 
defendants’ backgrounds and so on.  But those differences do not 
appear to explain the huge disparities at the bottom line in what these 
courts have determined to be the appropriate severity of punishment for 
financial reporting fraud.  Consider, for example, the recent sentencing 
of Sanjay Kumar, the high-profile former CEO of Computer Associates 
International (CA).  Kumar presided over an elaborate effort to 
misreport over two billion dollars in revenue, by falsely booking income 
in quarters in which CA did not receive it, and concealed the accounting 
fraud and obstructed government investigations including by destroying 
evidence.  The Sentencing Guidelines came out near the top of the 
scale, allowing for a sentence of life imprisonment without parole.  In 
response, the sentencing judge abandoned the Guidelines entirely, 
settling on a sentence of twelve years’ imprisonment and commenting 
that a sentence consistent with the Guidelines would “shock the 
conscience of this court.”52 
Some of these disparities are surely due to judges’ varying 
tolerance for the severity of the Guidelines, which I will explore in Part 
IV.  But some of these result from the absence of a clear methodology 
for comparing cases on the question of loss, which is prior to the 
question of absolute sentence severity. 
The bad news when we set out to improve the practice of 
measuring loss in financial reporting fraud cases is that fully accurate 
measurement of loss is difficult, perhaps not at all feasible.53  The good 
news, however, is that we do not need a perfect method of measuring 
loss.  We must remember why we care about loss.  We are striving for 
horizontal equity across criminal cases, not optimal monetary sanctions 
in a program of civil liability.  We need a relative measure, not an 
absolute one. 
In this Part, I will first describe a variety of methodologies for 
handling loss and its relationship to causation.  Then I will explain why 
a balance between being sufficiently sensitive to differences among 
cases and being practical a method that compares share prices during 
relevant periods before and after revelation of the fraud, with 
 
2006, at C1; John R. Emshwiller & John M. Biers, Fastow Gets Six Years As Judge Calls for 
Mercy, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Sept. 27, 2006, at A3. 
 52 See William M. Bulkeley, Former CA Chief is Sentenced to 12-Year Prison Term, Fined, 
WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Nov. 3, 2006, at A3.  The sentencing judge who presided in Kumar’s case, 
I. Leo Glasser, is neither novice nor softie; he is the senior district judge who presided over the 
trial of and sentenced mafia boss John Gotti. 
 53 See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 255 (1988) (White, J., dissenting) (rejecting idea 
“that stocks have some ‘true value’ that is measurable by a standard other than their market price.  
While the Scholastics of Medieval times professed a means to make such a valuation of a 
commodity’s ‘worth,’ I doubt that the federal courts of our day are similarly equipped.”). 
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adjustment for major events unrelated to the fraud. 
 
A.     Loss Methodologies 
 
Congress and the Sentencing Commission have been no help to 
courts faced with the task of determining loss in cases of financial 
reporting fraud.  The Guidelines tell judges only (and only in their 
application notes) to “make a reasonable estimate of the loss.”54  The 
court’s estimate 
shall be based on available information, taking into account, as 
appropriate and practicable under the circumstances, factors such 
as . . . fair market value . . . approximate number of victims 
multiplied by the average loss to each victim . . . [and] reduction that 
resulted from the offense in the value of equity securities or other 
corporate assets.55 
In a significant case of accounting fraud, our question of methodology 
for calculating loss is still begged—notwithstanding the Sentencing 
Commission’s perplexing statement that its recent direction to consider 
reduction in a company’s equity value “provide[s] courts additional 
guidance in determining loss in certain cases, particularly in complex 
white collar cases.”56  This absence of guidance is an abdication of 
responsibility.57 
“Market Capitalization” Approach.  The simplest method for 
calculating loss in an accounting fraud case is to measure the difference 
between the company’s share price before revelation of the fraud and 
the company’s share price at some relevant time following disclosure of 
the fraud.  This method assumes that any, and all, drop in equity value 
following revelation of the fraud is caused by the fraud.  In other words, 
it disregards causation.  In our Acme case, the loss would be $800 
million (the difference between twenty million shares at sixty dollars 
per share and twenty million shares at twenty dollars per share), if we 
chose to examine the initial five-day period of sharp decline following 
the fraud revelation on July 1, 2005.  If we instead chose the longer 
period of price decline continuing until December 31, 2005, the loss 
would be one billion dollars (the difference between twenty million 
shares at sixty dollars per share and twenty million shares at ten dollars 
per share).58 
 
 54 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(C). 
 55 Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(C)(i)-(iv). 
 56 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C (vol. II) (2003) (Amendment 653, at 365). 
 57 See Bibas, supra note 35, at 734 (“[T]he Sentencing Commission should clarify how to 
compute losses in areas that are currently murky, such as the large accounting-fraud cases 
premised on drops in a stock’s price.”). 
 58 See, e.g., United States v. Snyder, 291 F.3d 1291, 1295-96 (11th Cir. 2002) (reversing 
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This method, which has been described as the “market 
capitalization test,”59 fails to satisfy even the “any reasonable method” 
direction of the application notes to the Guidelines.  Not all of Acme’s 
shareholders bought at $60 and held the stock throughout the period of 
declining price following revelation of the fraud.60  The method 
measures maximum possible loss, not actual loss.61  Worse, the method 
simply assigns all of Acme’s share price decline to the revelation of the 
fraud without inquiry into actual causation, which would have to 
include consideration of other factors that could have affected share 
price.62 
Not surprisingly, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a 
judge who applied a method like this one, in United States v. Olis.63  
The case attracted public attention because of the draconian sentence 
(twenty-four years’ imprisonment) imposed on a mid-level accounting 
official with no record of misdeeds who helped implement a single 
fraudulent transaction designed to improve the financial picture of an 
energy firm, Dynegy Corporation.64  The district court found that the 
 
district court for abandoning loss calculation as not feasible and remanding for resentencing; 
observing that one acceptable method would measure the difference in market capitalization 
between (1) the share price’s average in the period from a press release falsely touting the 
company’s medical product as “effective” to the company’s announcement that the product was 
not effective and (2) the average share price during the three days following the announcement of 
the fraud, notwithstanding that the share price later rallied to a price significantly higher than (1)). 
 59 United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 127 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 60 See United States v. Bakhit, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1237 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
 61 One might further complain that even shareholders who bought at sixty dollars per share 
just before the fraud began are not harmed by the fraud, since revelation of the company’s 
problems immediately after those investors’ purchases, instead of managers’ pursuit of fraud, 
would have caused the same price decline.  However, this point is not quite persuasive.  Almost 
all accounting frauds cause harm over an extended period.  There are many points during the 
fraud period at which managers’ pursuit of fraud can be said to cause purchasers to forego the 
opportunity to limit losses by selling.  And information that managers would pursue fraud likely 
reduces the value of a company’s securities in the eyes of investors beyond any negative financial 
information that a fraud concealed.  See Ebbers, 458 F.3d at 127. 
 62 One court rejected a similar theory is the context of an initial public offering (IPO) that 
involved fraudulent representations.  Bakhit, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1236-37.  In Bakhit, it was argued 
that the loss should equate to the entire proceeds of the IPO because the offering was made on 
false terms.  The court declined to follow that reasoning on the ground that the venture had value 
notwithstanding the fraud, as evidenced by its survival after the fraud’s revelation.  Id.; see also 
Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 343 (2005) (“[a subsequent] lower price may reflect, 
not the earlier misrepresentation, but changed economic circumstances, changed investor 
expectations, new industry-specific or firm-specific facts, conditions, or other events, which taken 
separately or together account for some or all of that lower price”); Ebbers, 458 F.3d at 127 (the 
problem with “simplistic analysis” of market capitalization is that “[i]f the truth had been told [at 
the outset of the fraud, shareholders] would have suffered an immediate loss commensurate with 
the fraud loss because potential buyers at the earlier price would have immediately disappeared 
upon the bad news”). 
 63 429 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 2005). 
 64 See, e.g., John Gibeaut, Do the Crime, Serve More Time: Midlevel Dynegy Exec Feels the 
Brunt of New Guidelines, 13 A.B.A. J. E-REP., Apr. 2, 2004, at 1; Mike France, How Broken Is 
White Collar Justice?, BUS. WK., Apr. 5, 2004. 
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loss was at least $100 million, requiring a twenty-six level increase in 
the defendant’s Guidelines level, solely because a representative of a 
large institutional investor testified that his fund lost $105 million when 
Dynegy’s share price declined in the period after revelation of the 
fraud.65 
The Court of Appeals explained that sentencing judges must 
employ a “realistic, economic approach” to determining losses and 
explained that methods for measuring civil damages for securities fraud 
should form a “backdrop” to determining criminal responsibility.66  
Because the Supreme Court, in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo,67 
recently clarified the requirement of “loss causation” in civil securities 
cases, the Fifth Circuit said, sentencing courts may not find that there 
has been loss to shareholders “unless and until the truth is subsequently 
revealed and the price of the stock accordingly declines;” additionally, a 
sentencing court may not include price decline in a loss calculation 
“[w]here the value of a security declines for other reasons.”68  The Fifth 
Circuit acknowledged that a satisfactory loss methodology in criminal 
sentencing could be “less exact” than in civil litigation due to “time and 
evidentiary constraints on the sentencing process,” but the court rejected 
the market capitalization approach of the district court in Olis.69  The 
court remanded the case for the sentencing court to pursue “a more 
nuanced approach modeled upon loss causation principles.”70 
“Earnings Response Coefficient” and Intra-Period Shares.  A 
more rigorous method might be to develop a measure of the sensitivity 
of a company’s stock price to earnings announcements.  One might 
examine only those earnings announcements that were “clean” (not 
accompanied by other significant information that might affect price) 
and that varied from published forecasts or expectations about the 
company’s performance, in order to derive a coefficient measuring the 
amount by which the company’s stock price should be predicted to 
 
 65 Olis, 429 F.3d at 548. 
 66 Id. at 546 (quoting United States v. W. Coast Aluminum Heat Treating Co., 256 F.3d 986, 
991 (9th Cir. 2001)). 
 67 544 U.S. 336 (2005). 
 68 Olis, 429 F.3d at 546; see also United States v. Ebbers, 448 F.3d 110, 127-28 (2d Cir. 
2006).  “Loss causation” requires more than but-for causation, otherwise a shareholder could 
always recover for all losses incurred from investing in the stock on the argument that she would 
not have purchased the stock in the first place but for the defendant’s fakery.  Bowman, III, supra 
note 22, at 524. 
 69 Olis, 429 F.3d at 547. 
 70 Id.; see also United States v. Bakhit, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1238-39 (C.D. Cal. 2002) 
(rejecting market capitalization approach to calculating loss because many shareholders 
purchased at prices lower than the immediate pre-revelation price and because approach does not 
account for intervening causes of share price decline unrelated to the fraud).  For appellate 
decisions appearing to approve the market capitalization approach to calculating loss (on facts too 
sketchy to permit assessment of the decisions), see United States v. Eyman, 313 F.3d 741 (2d Cir. 
2002); United States v. Moskowitz, 215 F.3d 265 (2d Cir. 2000). 
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move in response to a given amount of variation between predicted and 
actual reported earnings.  (This is like a price-earnings multiple but for 
variation between actual earnings and earnings as forecast.)  One would 
then multiply the percentage of earnings change represented by the 
accounting fraud by this “earnings response coefficient” to derive the 
corresponding percentage change in share price.  Last, one would 
multiply that share price percentage by the total number of shares 
purchased during the fraud and held beyond the fraud’s disclosure, in 
order to derive total loss to victims. 
Suppose in our Acme case that a study of five years of earnings 
announcements by Acme revealed six occasions on which Acme 
reported earnings inconsistent with published forecasts and on which no 
other public information significantly affected Acme’s stock price.  
Over the six occasions on which Acme missed forecasts, Acme’s stock 
rose or fell by an average of twenty percent of the amount by which 
Acme’s earnings deviated from what was forecast.  Suppose further that 
eight million shares of Acme were bought between January 1, 2005 and 
July 1, 2005 (the period of the fraud) and held after the revelation of the 
fraud (after July 1, 2005).  Assume that the one billion dollars by which 
debt increased following revelation of the fraud represented a twenty 
percent increase in Acme’s debt load.  We would multiply that twenty 
percent reporting change by the twenty percent “earnings response 
coefficient,” to arrive at a four percent change in Acme’s stock price 
attributable to the fraud.  The decline in Acme’s share price attributable 
to the fraud, and not to other factors affecting the stock, is thus $2.40 
(four percent of the pre-revelation share price of sixty dollars).  With 
eight million shares affected by $2.40 per share, the total loss 
attributable to the fraud is $19,200,000.71 
This approach has a number of problems.  The most obvious issue 
in the Acme example is that the accounting fraud is related to debt, not 
to earnings.  For fraud in financial reporting other than inflated earnings 
numbers (for example, matters relating to a company’s debt, its business 
segment reporting, or its business prospects and plans), a company’s 
past “earnings response coefficient” tells us little if anything about the 
relationship between the fraud and the ensuing movement in the 
company’s share price.  We might even lack the necessary baseline to 
calculate the coefficient if, for example, the company had no recent 
history of missing earnings expectations.  Also, what if some mix of 
factors unrelated to the fraud causes a company’s share price to rise 
following revelation of the fraud?  Would we still apply the “earnings 
response coefficient” to derive a notional loss figure measuring the 
 
 71 The government unsuccessfully urged this methodology on the court, through testimony of 
an expert witness, in United States v. Grabske, 260 F. Supp. 2d 866 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
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seriousness of the fraud, or would we punish the fraud as having a 
seriousness level of zero because no actual loss occurred?  What if the 
stock price fell following revelation of the fraud but then bounced back 
relatively quickly?  The “earnings response coefficient” approach is 
appealingly sophisticated in relation to the market capitalization 
approach but it insufficiently represents the reality of causation in 
financial reporting fraud. 
Expert “Event Studies.”  A more fact-sensitive approach would be 
to allow the prosecution and the defense to present expert testimony 
describing “event studies,” under which experts attempt to identify and 
assign relative weights to all factors that could have caused change in a 
company’s stock price during the period following revelation of the 
fraud.  The proportion of price change attributable to the fraud would 
then be isolated, and the loss calculated according to the number of 
affected shares.72 
We need not explore the limitless variety of methodologies, many 
involving regression and other statistical techniques, that experts might 
employ in conducting such event studies.  Criminal sentencing is post-
trial litigation, not empirical research.  The only sure thing in a process 
of event studies is that there will be at least two experts in every case 
who arrive at widely varying loss numbers on the basis of different 
methods involving choices and assumptions subject to criticism.  In 
each case, a judge will have to decide which expert is more 
persuasive.73  (Or a judge could simply conduct a seat-of-the-pants 
judicial event study.)74  The objective of having a systematic 
 
 72 See, e.g., United States v. Bakhit, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1239 (C.D. Cal. 2002) 
(defendant’s expert netted losses of some shareholders against gains of others, then determined 
that fraud was responsible for only 17.47% of the company’s decline in share value while other 
factors such as bookkeeping mistakes caused remainder of decline); see also United States v. 
Brown, 338 F. Supp. 2d 552, 558 (M.D. Pa. 2004) (defendant’s expert concluded by means of an 
event study that loss to shareholders from accounting fraud involving Rite Aid corporation was 
zero); United States v. Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 2d 506, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (defendant’s expert 
concluded that estimating loss from fraud was impossible because too many “confounding 
factors” simultaneously affected company’s share price). 
 73 See, e.g., Akerman v. Oryx Comm., Inc., 810 F.2d 336, 343 (2d Cir. 1987) (granting 
summary judgment for defendant in suit brought under section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 
over misstatement in initial public offering, on ground that “the battle of the [expert loss] studies 
is at best equivocal; the studies do not meaningfully point in one direction or the other”).  Section 
11 of the Securities Act of 1933 permits a plaintiff to recover damages calculated under the 
market capitalization test discussed supra, subject to reduction for losses not attributable to any 
misstatement in the public offering materials, on which the defendant bears the burden of proof.  
See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (2006). 
 74 The Adelson court did this, concluding that the defendant was responsible for twenty 
percent of the stock decline following revelation of the fraud because that was “the Court’s rough 
approximation based on the modest extent of the actual overstatements [of earnings] in the 
context of the public loss of confidence in [the company’s] future that had already led to a large 
decline in share price even before [the defendant] joined the conspiracy.”  Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 
2d at 510; see also Beecher v. Able, 435 F. Supp. 397, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (in civil suit for 
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methodology for organizing fraud cases relative to each other on a 
single scale will be lost.75  Worse, the relative resources of the parties in 
a given case could determine whose expert event study prevails.  In 
addition, the process of litigating expert analysis of loss could mire 
courts in lengthy and complicated sentencing proceedings that are 
inconsistent with objectives of efficiency and finality in post-trial 
criminal adjudication.76 
Consider what happened in the Olis case on remand from the Fifth 
Circuit.77  The government’s expert submitted a highly elaborate event 
study, including complex regression analyses.  The expert concluded 
that the loss to Dynegy’s investors “net of market” following revelation 
of the fraud (booking of $300 million as cash flow from operations 
when truthfully it was borrowed funds)78 was between $161 million and 
$714 million, depending on a series of choices about which periods to 
examine and how much weight to ascribe to various events unrelated to 
the fraud.79  In response, the defendant submitted an analysis by an 
expert who argued—by examining the market’s reaction to disclosures 
about the fraud in the few days following each disclosure, coupled with 
Dynegy’s simultaneous disclosures of other adverse information not 
involving fraud—that the government’s analysis failed to establish that 
any decline in Dynegy’s stock price was caused by revelation of the 
fraud.80  The defense expert contended that the government also failed 
to establish any inflation in Dynegy’s stock price from the fraud 
because the stock did not rise in value when Dynegy initially filed 
financial statements that included the fraudulent numbers.81 
Faced with this contest of experts, the district court threw up its 
hands.  The court concluded that because the government’s expert 
analysis depended on “unprovable assumptions . . . it is not possible to 
estimate with any degree of reasonable certainty the actual loss to 
 
materially false offering prospectus under section 11 of Securities Act of 1933, court conducted 
elaborate loss analysis that included conclusions that, inter alia, “defendant’s financial difficulties 
were balanced off by the defendant’s probable recovery” and “[t]o correct for [the] aberration [of 
“panic selling”], the court adds 9 1/2 points to the market price of 75 1/2 to establish a figure of 
85 as fair value on the date of suit”). 
 75 See Grabske, 260 F. Supp. 2d at 874; Bakhit, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1240; Brown, 338 F. Supp. 
2d at 558. 
 76 See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 12.12[1] (5th ed. 2005) 
(“Theoretical models [of fraud loss], while useful to economists, may not be sufficiently based in 
reality to provide helpful expert testimony [as required by the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)].”). 
 77 United States v. Olis, No. H-03-217-01, 2006 WL 2716048 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2006). 
 78 See United States v. Olis, 429 F.3d 540, 541 (5th Cir. 2005). 
 79 See Olis, 2006 WL 2716048, at *4-8. 
 80 See Declaration of Professor Joseph A. Grundfest, United States v. Jamie Olis, Cr. No. H-
03-217 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 18, 2006), at 13-34 (on file with author). 
 81 See id. at 9-13. 
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shareholders caused by the corrective disclosures about [the fraud].”82  
The court instead settled on a loss figure of seventy-nine million dollars, 
which was the amount of tax savings the Dynegy perpetrators intended 
the company would also realize from its accounting maneuver.  The 
court recalculated the Guidelines range at 151 to 188 months, and then 
sentenced Olis to less than half of the bottom of the range (seventy-two 
months’ imprisonment), on the ground that no more punishment was 
necessary for general deterrence.83  Regardless of whether Olis deserved 
his original sentence of twenty-four years, his ultimate sentence of six 
years or some other sentence, Dynegy’s tax savings, while more easily 
quantified, hardly represented the gravamen of the accounting fraud for 
which Olis was convicted at trial. 
The sentencing court in Olis was not called upon to determine 
whether to compensate individuals who purchased Dynegy stock during 
the time the company was improperly burnishing its cash flow and 
minimizing its debt and lost money later.  The court had to determine 
the seriousness of the Dynegy accounting fraud relative to other frauds.  
“The causation story is just too complicated to work out” (and therefore 
the case should be treated as if it involved no loss to investors) is not an 
acceptable stopping point for a sentencing court. 
While the Olis court insisted that it was not concluding “that such 
estimates are never possible,”84 it is hard to see how litigants in virtually 
any case of accounting fraud would not be equally able to confound a 
sentencing court.  Hard cases of causation with convincing defense 
experts get punished less; easy cases of causation with less convincing 
defense experts get punished more.  We are back to the problem of a 
sentencing system that treats like cases differently according to 
nonrelevant distinctions.  Yet such a result seems almost inevitable 
(except perhaps for catastrophic cases like Enron or Worldcom) if we 
depend on the event study approach and insist that it meet a standard of 
“reasonable certainty” in all its statistical particulars. 
“Foreseeability” Approach.  A somewhat similar methodology to 
an event study, but more wedded to familiar concepts in criminal law 
and sentencing law, would be to determine the amount of loss that was 
“foreseeable” to the defendant.85  (The Guidelines partially follow this 
approach by placing a ceiling on the calculation of “actual loss” at what 
was “reasonably foreseeable” to the defendant.)86  For example, one 
might calculate the total ensuing loss to victims under something like 
 
 82  Olis, 2006 WL 2716048, at *8. 
 83 Id. at *10-13. 
 84 Id. at *9. 
 85 See, e.g., Bowman, III, supra note 22, at 532-36 (recommending rule requiring 
foreseeability in calculation of loss for all forms of economic crime). 
 86 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(i). 
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the market capitalization method and then reduce that amount to the 
portion deemed foreseeable to the defendant (or perhaps increase the 
amount by what the reasonable defendant would have expected if, 
fortuitously, loss was avoided).  This method does not improve on the 
event study approach in terms of requiring sentencing courts to make ad 
hoc determinations about which strands in a tangle of economic effects 
should affect a sentence and which should not.  The two methods might 
lead to the same battle of experts, since a litigant likely would argue that 
the “foreseeable” loss is whatever portion of the loss is properly 
attributed, in the view of her expert, to the defendant’s fraudulent acts 
rather than other market factors. 
 PSLRA, aka “Average Selling Price” or “Rescissory” Approach.  
Congress recently has spoken on the question how to calculate loss in 
securities fraud cases, albeit not in the criminal context.  The Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act provides, in pertinent part, that:  
the award of damages to the plaintiff shall not exceed the difference 
between the purchase or sale price paid or received, as appropriate, 
by the plaintiff for the subject security and the mean trading price of 
that security during the 90-day period beginning on the date on 
which the information correcting the misstatement or omission that is 
the basis for the action is disseminated to the market.87 
One court applying a methodology like this in a criminal 
sentencing called it a “rescissory measure” of loss because the process 
calculates loss according to what would be necessary to return the 
victim to the same position she occupied before the fraud induced her to 
purchase, sell or hold the company’s security.88 
To apply this approach in our Acme example, we would calculate 
the average price of the stock during the period of the fraud (January 2, 
2005 to July 1, 2005) (let’s call this the “average fraud price”) and the 
average price of the stock during the ninety-day period following 
disclosure of the fraud (let’s call this the “average post-fraud price”).  
We would subtract the average post-fraud price from the average fraud 
price to derive the loss per share.  We then would multiply the loss per 
share by the number of affected shares to derive the total loss figure.  If 
Acme’s average fraud price was fifty-five dollars, Acme’s average post-
 
 87 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e)(1) (2006). 
 88 United States v. Grabske, 260 F. Supp. 2d 866, 872 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (relying on In re 
Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.3d 454 (9th Cir. 2000)); see also Pidcock v. Sunnyland Am., 
Inc., 854 F.2d 443, 446 (11th Cir. 1988) (in civil suit for fraud by purchaser of securities, seller is 
entitled to what seller would have received absent fraudulent conduct; if purchaser gains more 
than seller’s loss, seller is entitled to purchaser’s profits because “it is simple equity that a 
wrongdoer should disgorge his fraudulent enrichment”) (quoting Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 
786 (1st Cir. 1965)); HAZEN, supra note 76, § 12.12[2] (“When the essence of the plaintiff’s 
claim is fraud in the inducement—namely, that he or she would not have entered into the 
transaction but for the defendant’s fraud, rescission is arguably the proper measure of damages.”). 
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fraud price was thirty dollars, and the number of affected shares was 
eight million, then the loss amount for Guidelines purposes would be 
$200 million.89 
This method has been described as “rescissory” because its choice 
to ignore other factors that may have contributed to the decline in share 
price during the ninety-day period following revelation of the fraud is 
justified on the ground that the injured party is entitled to be put back in 
the position she occupied before disclosure of the fraud.90  Obviously, 
making victims whole is the business of damages, not imprisonment.  
But in criminal cases we must weigh the objective of measuring relative 
blameworthiness with exactitude against the objectives of practicality in 
sentencing proceedings and uniformity of methodology across the range 
of cases of financial reporting fraud.91  The method thus has appeal even 
if it is rough. 
We could compromise between the PSLRA and event study 
approaches.  For example, suppose that a company announced a $500 
million restatement of earnings, $250 million of which was due to 
correction of fraudulent accounting and $250 million of which was due 
to errors or other factors not involving fraud.  The loss figure 
attributable to the fraud might be fifty percent of the difference between 
the average fraud price and the average post-fraud price.92  Of course, 
this method again stumbles in any case in which the fraud involves 
conduct not strictly quantifiable as overstated income or understated 
losses.  In addition, the method assumes that restated earnings results 
correlate directly with decreased share price rather than considering, for 
example, whether the market punished the stock more for the fraud than 
for the errors unrelated to the fraud because the fraud communicated 
important information about management integrity. 
A frequent objection to a PSLRA-type approach, as well as to 
other methods of calculating loss from fraud on the market, is that the 
method overstates losses because many shareholders profit from the 
fraud—for example, by purchasing shares before the fraud, holding 
them while they are inflated by the fraud, and selling them before they 
 
 89 This method was employed by the district courts in United States v. Brown, 338 F. Supp. 
2d 552 (M.D. Pa. 2004); Grabske, 260 F. Supp. 2d at 866; and United States v. Bakhit, 218 F. 
Supp. 2d 1232, 1232 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
 90 See Grabske, 260 F. Supp. 2d at 874.  The method has also been described as the “Average 
Selling Price Methodology.”  Brown, 338 F. Supp. 2d at 557. 
 91 See Grabske, 260 F. Supp. 2d at 874-75; see also Bakhit, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1242 (“[T]he 
district court need not find a perfect theoretical model to calculate loss, only a realistic, economic 
approach.”). 
 92 The court applied this method in Brown, 338 F. Supp. 2d at 557-58.  In addition, the Brown 
court subtracted from the loss amount an eleven-cent dividend to shareholders during the relevant 
period and, in calculating the number of affected shares, it “split[] the difference” between the 
high and low ends of what the defendant’s expert estimated as the range of quantity of potentially 
affected shares.  Id. at 558-60. 
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decline in value upon revelation of the fraud.93  A variation on this 
objection is that sanctions levied against the enterprise in civil securities 
cases involving fraud on the market can be wasteful and ineffective, by 
transferring wealth from one group of winning shareholders to another 
group of losing shareholders.94  A further point is that even sanctioning 
individual violators may be a mistaken response to something that is not 
a social cost, given that the diversified investor will, on a net basis over 
time, be neither a winner nor a loser from fraud.95 
There are answers to these objections, including that some such 
arguments prove too much to be plausible (e.g., fraud is as beneficial as 
it is harmful so it need not be deterred?).96  But we should not be 
detained by theoretical debate over optimal civil sanctions for securities 
fraud.97  We are striving for proportionality and rationality in criminal 
sentencing.  The Sentencing Guidelines make clear that netting some 
people’s gains against others’ losses in a fraudulent scheme is not 
appropriate in measuring the seriousness of fraud for criminal purposes. 
(The Sentencing Commission uses the example of how early victims 
may gain in a Ponzi scheme).98  The Second Circuit also has expressed 
this view.99 
The Commission and the Second Circuit are right.  In measuring 
loss for purposes of punishing criminal securities fraud, we are 
determining the relative seriousness of a form of wrongdoing we have 
decided to prohibit in service of retributive and deterrent aims of 
criminal punishment, not measuring how to make victims whole or 
determining the optimal level of fraud to tolerate.100  If, as discussed in 
 
 93 See STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND 
ANALYSIS 348 (2005). 
 94 See, e.g., Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on 
Securities Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 691. 
 95 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52 
U. CHI. L. REV. 611, 640-41 (1985); see also Richard A. Booth, Who Should Recover What for 
Securities Fraud? (Dec. 2005) (working paper), available at http://digitalcommons. 
law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1011&context=fac_pubs. 
 96 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 459-60 (6th ed. 2003) (imposing 
sanctions for fraud on the market provides incentive to monitor managers to prevent fraud, even if 
costs are borne by “innocent” shareholders; fraud on the market imposes social costs including 
increased costs to all investors of  acquiring truthful information about firms). 
 97 For a recent summary and analysis of the debate, see Larry E. Ribstein, Fraud on a Noisy 
Market (Univ. of Ill., Law & Econ. Research Paper No. LEO5-022), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=803064. 
 98 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(F)(iv) (“[G]ain to an individual 
investor . . . shall not be used to offset the loss to another individual investor.”). 
 99 See United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 126 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 100 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 95, at 621-22 (suggesting that there is no efficient 
level of deliberate fraud); see also Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 270-71 
(1992) (conducting careful proximate cause inquiry in determining who may sue for damages 
under RICO for losses caused by securities fraud; finding link too remote between broker-dealers 
and customers who did not purchase fraudulent products but were harmed by broker-dealers’ 
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Part II, the seriousness of a criminal fraud on the market is primarily a 
function of the quantity of investor trust a manager held and violated, 
then the quantity of investor losses is a good measure of seriousness, 
regardless of whether other fortunate investors (including in many cases 
managers) happened to profit from the fraud. 
 
B.     Preferred Loss Methodology 
 
Adherence causation principles dictate that the measure of loss for 
sentencing purposes, like the measure of damages in a civil suit for 
securities fraud, be calculated as the difference between what the seller 
or buyer received and what the seller or buyer would have received had 
there been no fraudulent conduct.101  However, empirical limitations of 
the litigation process, demands of efficiency, clarity, finality and 
uniformity in the sentencing process, and the impetus to avoid 
burdening the public fisc with expensive and often inconclusive expert 
contests in criminal cases necessitate compromising some precision.102  
The trick is to find an adequate methodology between a case-specific 
event study and a grossly inaccurate approach like market 
capitalization.  The objective is not to derive absolute truth about the 
seriousness of a particular case.  Nor is it, as in a civil suit for securities 
fraud, to make victims whole for all of (and no more than) their actual 
dollar losses.  Nor is it (at least not only) to regulate fraud to the 
efficient level.  The objective is to effectively arrange cases along a 
scale in relation to each other, without failing to account for major 
relevant distinctions among them.103 
The PSLRA method fares well, provided we modify it to allow for 
important case-specific factors that are observable and quantifiable with 
market data and without the use of elaborate and contestable 
methods.104  Loss for purposes of a criminal sentence in a case of 
 
insolvency resulting from fraud). 
 101 See Pidcock v. Sunnyland Am., Inc., 854 F.2d 443, 446 (11th Cir. 1988) (citing Affiliated 
Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972)). 
 102 See United States v. Bakhit, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1242 (this method “is based upon 
objective trading data, easily obtained, that minimizes the speculation”). 
 103 See Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268 (describing proximate cause as “the judicial tools used to limit 
a person’s responsibility for the consequences of that person’s own acts . . .  [T]he notion of 
proximate cause reflects “what is . . . administratively possible and convenient.’”) (quoting W. 
KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 
264 (5th ed. 1984)). 
 104 To be sure, there are reasons for distinguishing the process of assessing civil damages from 
the process of imposing criminal punishment.  See United States v. Mooney, 425 F.3d 1093, 1101 
(8th Cir. 2005) (rejecting loss method for determining sentence in insider trading case that would 
have pursued complicated inquiry into when market fully absorbed nonpublic information); id. at 
1107 (Bright, J., dissenting) (loss method based on difference between defendant’s purchase price 
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financial statement fraud should be determined as follows: Calculate the 
average share price during the period from the commencement of the 
fraud until the last day before first public revelation of any aspect of the 
fraud (the average fraud price); calculate the average share price during 
the ninety days following the first date of public revelation of any 
aspect of the fraud (the average post-fraud price); estimate as accurately 
as possible the total number of shares that were purchased between the 
commencement of the fraud and the first date of public revelation of 
any aspect of the fraud and that were held at least until the first date 
following first public revelation of the fraud (the affected shares);105 
finally, subtract the average post-fraud price from the average fraud 
price and multiply by the number of affected shares to derive an initial 
total loss figure. 
A complication at this stage of this analysis might be uncertainty 
over the time of first public revelation of the fraud.  Suppose in our 
Acme example that four weeks before CEO held the July 1, 2006 
conference call announcing the earnings corrections, a magazine that 
covers Wall Street ran a cover story on Acme’s accounting practices, 
headlined “Are Acme’s Numbers Reliable?” and raising questions about 
the company’s off-balance-sheet structures.  In the Acme hypothetical 
as given, we would be unlikely to ascribe significance to that article 
because the stock price did not decline prior to CEO’s July 1 
announcements.  But what if the article had made investors skittish 
about Acme and the stock had slipped a bit in the wake of its 
publication? 
It would seem prudent to begin counting equity decline from the 
point of the first public allegation of the same fraud that later resulted in 
a criminal case.  The point is not to punish for the effect of rumors; if 
early speculation later proved groundless, there would be no criminal 
case requiring loss analysis.  If, however, the market begins to bid the 
stock down before a company representative (or a prosecutor or a court) 
finally and definitively states “this was a fraud,” excluding that loss 
would defeat the object of treating cases equitably.  A case’s 
seriousness would hinge fortuitously on how and when the fraud was 
 
and defendant’s later sale price (as opposed to difference between defendant’s purchase price and 
true value of stock on date of purchase) means that multiple defendants who commit “the same 
crime” by purchasing on same date on basis of same nonpublic information end up with different 
sentences if they happen to sell on different dates).  However, the PSLRA method is not 
complicated, it does capture blameworthiness (the more investor funds placed in jeopardy, the 
worse the accounting fraud) and there are also benefits, in terms of the development of doctrine, 
in having similar approaches to loss applied in both civil and criminal cases. 
 105 In the interest of brevity, I will not explore in depth methodologies for estimating quantity 
of affected shares.  It does not matter greatly if courts use a method that may tend to overestimate 
quantity, as long as all use the same method.  Any such systematic effects can be corrected for in 
calibrating the loss scale as discussed in Part IV. 
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revealed, rather than the fraud’s severity, and an even greater than 
existing incentive would develop for company managers to deny and 
bleed out information about fraud rather than quickly to come clean. 
Next, it would be simple and sensible to adjust in all cases for a 
stock’s “beta.”  The basic capital asset pricing model measures a stock’s 
historical return rate in relation to the historical return rate of the 
market, where a beta of 1.0 means that a stock moves ten percent when 
the market moves ten percent; a beta of .5 means a stock moves five 
percent when the market moves ten percent; a beta of 2.0 means a stock 
moves twenty percent when the market moves ten percent; and so on.106  
We thus would determine the stock’s beta, calculate how much the 
market moved during any period in which we are measuring movement 
in the stock for loss purposes, and adjust the change in price during that 
period with reference to the stock’s beta.107 
Last, the method should allow for a measure of discretion.  In cases 
in which an event unrelated to the fraud plainly caused a significant 
change in share price, either during the fraud or in the period after 
revelation, the court should modify the loss figure.  Let’s supplement 
our Acme case with a complicating fact about causation.  Suppose that 
the same day CEO held the conference call with Wall Street disclosing 
the accounting fraud, the press reported that the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) was considering imposing a new 
ratings system for broadcasts to cell phones, designed to protect 
children, that could substantially delay and complicate industry plans to 
implement this technology.  On December 30, 2005, the press reported 
that the FCC had voted to abandon the new ratings initiative.  Recall 
that Acme’s stock declined from sixty to twenty dollars between 
revelation of the fraud and December 31, but rebounded to thirty dollars 
after December 31. 
We need a transparent and relatively objective method of 
accounting for these events, even if it might be somewhat rough.  The 
best way to ensure transparency and objectivity is to keep calculations 
simple and tied to market data.  We could deal with the FCC 
information by noting that the stock rebounded to thirty dollars 
following elimination of the risk of delay and complications upon the 
FCC vote.  We thus would set thirty dollars as a floor in calculating the 
average post-fraud price.  If we did this, the average post-fraud price 
might turn out to be approximately forty-five dollars (the mid-point 
 
 106 See CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 93, at 22-23. 
 107 Suppose that a company’s stock moved downward from $100 to eighty dollars (by twenty 
percent) in the ninety days following the fraud; that the company’s average stock price during 
those ninety days was ninety dollars; that the market also moved downward by twenty percent 
during those ninety days; and that the company’s beta is .5.  The average post-fraud price in such 
a case would be ninety-five dollars. 
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between sixty and thirty dollars), rather than forty dollars (the mid-point 
between sixty and twenty dollars).  The result in the Acme case, 
assuming an average fraud price of fifty-five dollars, an average post-
fraud price of forty-five dollars, and eight million affected shares, 
would be a final loss figure of eighty million dollars. 
What about harder cases in which, for example, two pieces of 
information apt to depress the stock price, only one of which involved 
fraud revelation, hit the market simultaneously, so that we cannot 
isolate the fraud effects by examining only certain days of price 
activity?  The sentencing stage is not reached without a jury’s finding of 
materiality (or an admission thereof).108  It is not without justification to 
say the offender who inflated (or artificially propped up) the stock is 
responsible for the consequential harm to all investors who purchased 
the stock in reliance on the offender’s lies.  And a rule that the presence 
of confounding causes should lead to a finding of no loss would provide 
a strong incentive to bury fraud revelations in release of other 
information designed to complicate causation inquiry.109   
The government must prove that the defendant caused the loss a 
court uses to enhance punishment.  But there needs to be a workable 
procedure for unpacking a case of simultaneous causes, so that 
confounding causation does not equate to zero causation.  We might 
allow a limited role for expert event analysis—solely to establish, in 
cases of simultaneous causes not of obviously different weights, a 
greater likelihood than not that the fraud caused approximately half the 
loss.  Application of such a standard across cases would serve the goal 
of horizontal equity far better than a practice in which some portion of 
cases involving multiple causes were treated as if they were cases of no 
loss. 
Finally, what about the problem of the offender who has a 
relatively small role in a large fraud, or enters the scheme relatively 
late?  Should all participants in a fraud scheme bear the same loss figure 
for sentencing purposes, or should we discount the loss figure for 
reduced culpability?  The Sentencing Guidelines have long followed a 
general approach (not just with economic crimes) of ascribing to 
offenders joint and several responsibility for the results of criminal 
activity in which they participate.110  This approach is moderated in two 
ways.  First, an offender is ordinarily responsible for all acts that she 
commits or aids; for conspiratorial involvement, however, responsibility 
 
 108 But see John C. Coffee, Jr., Causation By Presumption? Why the Supreme Court Should 
Reject Phantom Losses and Reverse Broudo, 60 BUS. LAW. 533, 541 (2005) (noting that legally 
material facts do not necessarily move the market). 
 109 See James C. Spindler, Why Shareholders Want Their CEOs to Lie More After Dura 
Pharmaceuticals, 95 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2007). 
 110 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3. 
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is ascribed only for “reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of 
others in furtherance of a jointly undertaken criminal activity.”111  The 
fraud guideline also contains its own foreseeability limitation on the 
calculation of loss.112  Second, an offender is eligible for a four-point 
reduction in offense level if she “was a minimal participant” or a two-
point reduction if she “was a minor participant.”113  Thus there may be 
cases in which an offender with a small role in a large conspiracy will 
end up with a lower loss figure due to foreseeability restrictions.  In any 
event, all offenders are theoretically eligible for a role reduction without 
regard to calculation of the loss figure.  Keeping in mind that the 
objective is relative measurement of cases, contrasted for example with 
calculation of precise damages a given violator should pay, these 
existing adjustments are sufficient to account for role differences. 
 
IV.     CALIBRATING THE SCALE 
 
Alas, our analysis of how to measure the seriousness of a case of 
financial reporting fraud is academic at the moment.  Equity is an 
important goal but equally irrational sentences are still irrational.  The 
Guidelines as presently ordered push almost every large case of public 
company reporting fraud off the top of the charts, meaning that most 
methodologies for calculating loss end up with the same result in terms 
of imprisonment.114  In addition, the Guidelines double- and triple-count 
other factors beside loss, to the point where application of the 
Guidelines can become absurd, yielding results so astronomical that no 
one rationally could have intended them.  Only a Congress that had 
entirely abandoned proportionality as an objective in sentencing could 
embrace the results that sometimes follow under present law; at least at 
a general level, this Congress has maintained fealty to proportionality as 
a sentencing goal.115  Even the severe federal narcotics Guidelines, 
except for major participants in cases involving extremely large 
quantities of drugs, are not as severe as the current Guidelines for the 
 
 111 Id. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). 
 112 Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(iv). 
 113 Id. § 3B1.2. 
 114 See United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 129 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[Defendant’s] arguments 
with regard to the loss calculation encounter a hard fact.  A 26-level loss calculation has a $100 
million threshold, which is easily surpassed under any calculation.”); United States v. Olis, 450 
F.3d 583, 587 (5th Cir. 2006) (denying bail for defendant scheduled to be resentenced after 
appeals court reversed district court for insufficiently rigorous loss calculation, in part on ground 
that “even were [the defendant] held responsible for only one percent of [the original loss] 
amount ($1 million), [he] would still face an imprisonment range of 97 to 121 months”). 
 115 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2006) (requiring federal courts to impose sentences “sufficient, but 
not greater than necessary” to accomplish deterrence, reflect the seriousness of the offense, and 
avoid unwarranted disparities among defendants). 
 2007] FINANCIAL REPORTING FRAUD  1643 
largest accounting frauds.116 
To see why recalibration is needed to achieve rationality in 
sentencing for financial reporting fraud, let’s work our Acme example 
through the current Guidelines.  Because the offense of conviction is 
securities fraud, the base offense level is 7.117  Next we add points for 
dollar loss.  Assume we apply the preferred (and relatively 
conservative) methodology described above, deriving a loss of eighty 
million dollars.  We would add twenty-four points, reaching level 31.118  
(If we instead used the market capitalization approach, with the loss 
being some $800 million, we would add thirty points, reaching level 37 
at this stage.)119  But we are not done.  Because Acme is a large public 
company and many shareholders were harmed, we would add another 
six points, reaching level 37.120  Because accounting fraud inevitably 
involves “sophisticated means,” we would add another two points, 
reaching level 39.121  Because COO, CFO and CAO were officers of a 
public company, we would add another four levels, reaching level 43.122  
Finally, CAO would probably merit a further increase of two levels for 
being “an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor” in the crime, 
reaching level 45.123 
At level 43, the Guidelines provide for a sentence of life 
imprisonment without parole as the only available option.124  Even a 
relatively conservative estimate of loss can send the offense level above 
the Guidelines’ top level of 43, meaning that reductions for pleading 
guilty or for not qualifying for some of the enhancements described 
above may have no material effect on the bottom-line result under the 
Guidelines.125  In addition, we did not consider another enhancement 
often applicable in large cases of accounting fraud: If the offense 
“substantially endangered the solvency or financial security” of a 
 
 116 See Bowman, III, supra note 35, at 334 (“No other class of federal crime produces offense 
levels [as high as for large corporate frauds].”).  For example, the current narcotics Guidelines 
provide that no defendant who receives a downward adjustment for mitigating role in the offense 
may have a base offense level of more than 30, even though drug quantity ordinarily can drive the 
base offense level as high as 38.  See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(a)(3).  
The fraud Guidelines contain no equivalent ceiling for minor offense participants. 
 117 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(a)(1). 
 118 Id. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(M). 
 119 Id. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(P). 
 120 Id. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(C) (adding six levels for offense involving 250 or more victims). 
 121 Id. § 2B1.1(b)(9). 
 122 Id. § 2B1.1(b)(15)(A). 
 123 Id. § 3B1.1(c).  If COO, CFO and CAO enlisted other employees in the accounting fraud, 
this increase could go up to four levels.  Id. § 3B1.1(a). 
 124 Id.  Sentencing Table. 
 125 See, e.g., United States v. Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 2d 506, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (government 
argued that correct application of Guidelines resulted in total offense level of 55; court remarked, 
“55 is a level normally only seen in cases involving major international narcotics traffickers, 
Mafia dons, and the like”). 
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publicly traded company (as would be true in a bankruptcy or near 
bankruptcy), yet another four levels are added.126  The Guidelines 
provide that any offense level above 43 is to be treated as level 43, 
requiring life without parole.127  (Apparently the drafters of the 
Sentencing Table did not talk to the drafters of the fraud Guideline: An 
application note to the Sentencing Table acknowledges that an offense 
level over 43 “may result” but says this will occur only in “rare 
cases.”)128 
One might think these nonsensical results are a product of 
overreaction to Enron and other major corporate scandals of 2001 and 
2002.  While it is true that the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation129 caused 
increases in the penalties for white collar crime, Sarbanes-Oxley turns 
out to be only part of the story.  The bigger problem is that no 
lawmaker, in Congress or at the Sentencing Commission, has seriously 
considered the problem of how the Guidelines applicable to all fraud 
cases work in the special case of financial reporting fraud in public 
companies.130  In 2001, the Sentencing Commission adopted a major 
revision of the Guidelines governing economic crimes, after a process 
that a leading expert on the Guidelines has praised as “long, careful, 
open, and consultative” and “guidelines lawmaking as it was intended to 
work.”131  Yet even the 2001 Guidelines could result in strikingly long 
terms of imprisonment for financial reporting fraud. 
Consider our Acme example under the 2001 Guidelines.  We 
would have started at a base offense level of 6.132  With our 
conservative loss methodology resulting in a figure of eighty million 
dollars, we would have added twenty-four levels, reaching level 30.133  
We then would have added four levels for the number of victims 
involved in the offense, reaching level 34.134  We would have added two 
more levels because the fraud involved “sophisticated means,” reaching 
level 36.135  The sentencing range for a first-time offender such as CFO 
 
 126 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(13)(B). 
 127 Id. Sentencing Table, cmt. n.2. 
 128 Id.   
 129 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745. 
 130 See Bowman, III, supra note 22, at 527 (“When the drafters of the Guidelines created a 
sentencing scheme for economic crime which made measurement of harm the predominant 
sentencing factor, but failed to define the required causal relation between the criminal conduct 
and the harm to be measured, the current thicket of uncertainty became not only predictable, but 
inevitable.”). 
 131 Frank O. Bowman, III, Pour encourager les autres?  The Curious History and Distressing 
Implications of the Criminal Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Sentencing Guidelines 
Amendments that Followed, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 373, 390 (2004). 
 132 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(a) (2001). 
 133 Id. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(M). 
 134 Id. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(B). 
 135 Id. § 2B1.1(b)(9). 
 2007] FINANCIAL REPORTING FRAUD  1645 
at level 36 was 188 to 235 months (15.6 to 19.5 years).136  For CAO, 
who would probably have merited a further increase of two levels for 
being “an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor” in the crime, the 
sentencing range would have been 235 to 293 months (19.5 to 24.4 
years), at level 38.137 
In a more serious case than our Acme example, the 2001 
Guidelines (like the post-Sarbanes-Oxley Guidelines) could result in a 
sentence of life imprisonment without parole.  That severe result was 
apparently called for under the Guidelines as calculated by the United 
States Probation Department at the sentencing of former Worldcom 
CEO Bernard Ebbers, which involved pre-Sarbanes-Oxley offenses.138  
Indeed, the case that has become most emblematic of harshness in 
current white collar sentencing, United States v. Olis, involved a 
sentence of 24.3 years imposed under the 2001 Guidelines; Sarbanes-
Oxley applied to neither the criminal liability nor the sentence in Olis.139 
Sarbanes-Oxley made matters worse by causing a further, 
unnecessary ratcheting-up of the Guidelines in fraud cases through a 
process that involved virtually no consideration of the wisdom and 
necessity of further increases.140  Indeed, until the eleventh hour, the 
Department of Justice did not take the position before Congress that 
further increases in the Guidelines governing white collar crime were a 
necessary or appropriate response to the spate of corporate scandals.141  
But the more fundamental problem is that no lawmaker appears to have 
done any real thinking about how to punish financial reporting fraud—
at any stage, notwithstanding that we have now spent over two decades 
on the project of rationalizing criminal sentencing and that Congress 
passed an entire package of legislation in direct response to a spate of 
accounting fraud. 
Sentencing judges, of course, are the recipients of this problem.  
They must find an appropriate way to punish defendants in cases of 
financial reporting fraud in the absence of clear, rational guidance.  The 
draconian effect of the Guidelines leads to one of two results, neither 
satisfactory and both undermining the objectives of proportionality and 
equality in sentencing.  Some judges are simply applying the 
 
 136 Id.  Sentencing Table. 
 137 Id. § 3B1.1(c); Sentencing Table. 
 138 See United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 126-30 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 139 United States v. Olis, 429 F.3d 540, 544 (5th Cir. 2005). 
 140 Frank Bowman has exhaustively recounted this process.  Bowman, III, supra note 131, at 
392-419.  There is no need to repeat the clear and dispiriting story he tells.  One aspect is worth 
emphasis for purposes of my discussion: Most of what Sarbanes-Oxley did on the criminal side 
involved increasing the statutory maxima for many white-collar offenses, a measure that was 
almost exclusively symbolic and immaterial to sentencing given that most cases of securities and 
wire fraud can and do lead to many charged counts.  See id. at 399-405. 
 141 See id. at 395. 
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Guidelines, as written and in full force, resulting in sentences of nearly 
life imprisonment for offenses that no one can have intended would (or 
honestly believe should) result in such punishments.142  (No judge, to 
my knowledge, has bit the bullet and imposed a sentence of life 
imprisonment without parole on a white collar offender, but perhaps this 
is only a matter of time.)143  Other judges are abandoning the Guidelines 
entirely in such cases, on the basis of their facial irrationality, and 
sentencing offenders to greatly reduced terms of imprisonment that 
comport with the judge’s own conception of just punishment for 
corporate fraud.144  The problem of disparity in fraud sentencing is, at 
present, double-faceted: We lack consensus on methodology for 
calculating loss and the current Guidelines are so unreasonable that, 
even if courts were applying a consistent loss methodology, many 
judges would still be defecting from the system to impose non-
Guidelines sentences. 
Four conclusions seem obvious: (1) loss to investors is the proper 
common denominator to measure cases of financial statement fraud; (2) 
an appropriate methodology for measuring loss must balance the need 
for clarity, efficiency, and uniformity in sentencing across cases with 
the need for ascribing responsibility only for the actual results of 
offenders’ criminal conduct; (3) any “loss table” that arrays the cases in 
terms of seriousness, and primarily drives the severity of terms of 
 
 142 See, e.g., Ebbers, 458 F.3d at 129-30 (affirming sentence of twenty-five years’ 
imprisonment as “harsh but not unreasonable” in view of “Congress’ policy decisions on 
sentences for fraud”; stating, “[I]t may well be that all but the most trivial frauds in publicly 
traded companies may trigger sentences amounting to life imprisonment . . . .  However, the 
Guidelines reflect Congress’ judgment as to the appropriate national policy for such crimes.”).  In 
Ebbers, the district court actually demonstrated some leniency by imposing a sentence of twenty-
five years even though the court calculated the Guidelines at thirty years to life and the Probation 
Department calculated them at life.  See also Olis, 429 F.3d at 541-42 (district court sentenced 
“Senior Director of Tax Planning” for a Houston energy company to 24.3 years in prison for 
single fraudulent transaction relating to financial reporting; appeals court reversed on grounds of 
improper methodology for calculating loss, not harshness of sentence). 
 143 I have found one case in which the government actually argued (dutifully, but without 
much conviction) for a sentence of life without parole.  See United States v. Adelson, 441 F. 
Supp. 2d 506, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).  In discussion about the death penalty, one often hears the 
point that one can posit at least one case in which most would agree that a death sentence is just 
punishment (unimpeachable forensic proof of a mass murder of hundreds of random victims 
including children, and so on).  I have not seen anyone posit the facts of a white collar crime that 
would cause most people to conclude that a sentence of life imprisonment without parole would 
be just.  I, at least, cannot imagine such a case.  Id. at 511 (“[e]ven the government blinked at 
[the] barbarity” of a sentence of eighty-five years’ imprisonment for a forty-year-old convicted 
executive). 
 144 See id. at 515 (court imposed sentence of forty-two months when Guidelines provided for 
life sentence because “the guidelines have so run amok that they are patently absurd on their 
face”); Transcript of Sentencing, United States v. Daniel Bayly, No. H-CR-03-963 (S.D. Tex. 
Apr. 21, 2005) (on file with author) (sentencing defendant to thirty months’ imprisonment where 
Guidelines provided for sentence over ten years because “[f]or a person who has been a leader in 
the investment banking world to go to prison at all is a deterrent effect upon others”). 
 2007] FINANCIAL REPORTING FRAUD  1647 
imprisonment, must be calibrated rationally and proportionally; and (4) 
additional factors may appropriately mitigate or aggravate sentences but 
they should not undermine proportionality and rationality by skewing 
most or all sentences to the top of the punishment scale, or by double-
counting factors such as the number of investors harmed.145 
These conclusions lead me to the following reform 
recommendations: 
 
i. Adopt a separate guideline governing financial reporting 
fraud.  It is a mistake to equate the loss involved in an 
embezzlement, a theft, or a scam with the loss that results 
when a public company reveals financial reporting fraud.  
Because the loss in financial reporting cases is less direct, 
more diffused, more complicated as a matter of causation 
and often of massively larger scale, such cases should not 
be measured on the same scale as routine fraud cases.146 
 
ii. In that separate guideline, direct courts to follow a single, 
workable, and realistic methodology for calculating loss as 
described in Part III.B.  This methodology should rely on 
the approach dictated by the PSLRA, modified by 
permitting courts to adjust the relevant share price  but only 
with reference to objective, quantifiable market data such 
as the company’s own stock history or relevant indices 
such as the S&P 500. 
 
iii. In that separate guideline, set the base offense level higher 
than at present (perhaps at level 12), because any case of 
public company fraud on shareholders is more serious than 
the lowest-level cases of ordinary theft and fraud.  Then set 
the loss table significantly lower than at present.  Twelve of 
the sixteen levels on the current loss table are set at 
amounts of fifty million dollars or less, plainly rendering 
 
 145 I do not mean to suggest that there is not room for reforms in other areas of the Guidelines.  
However, the problems with the Guidelines in major fraud cases are so glaring that they ought to 
provide among the very least controversial (and therefore realistic) places to seek improvement. 
 146 See Ebbers, 458 F.3d at 128 (even under defense expert’s “event study” calculation, which 
attributed only thirty-five percent of stock decline to accounting fraud, loss amount still over one 
billion dollars); Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 509 (“Since successful public companies typically 
issue millions of publicly traded shares . . . the precipitous decline in stock price that typically 
accompanies a revelation of fraud generates a multiplier effect that may lead to guideline offense 
levels that are, quite literally, off the chart.”).  In addition, there is no need to saddle the project of 
reforming the Guidelines as they apply to financial statement fraud with the burden of persuading 
people to revise the entire framework governing economic crimes.  A separate guideline for 
accounting fraud cases is also natural given that existing law includes a separate guideline for 
insider trading.  See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.4. 
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the general loss table ill-suited to financial reporting fraud 
involving large public companies.  A suitable loss table for 
financial reporting fraud might be set approximately as 
follows: 
 
LOSS LEVEL INCREASE
≤ $500,000 0 
> $1,000,000 4 
> $4,000,000 6 
> $10,000,000 8 
> $20,000,000 10 
> $50,000,000 12 
> $100,000,000 14 
> $500,000,000 16 
> $1,000,000,000 18 
 
Calibrating the loss table would be the most contestable 
step in reforming this aspect of sentencing.  I do not mean 
to engage that debate fully or defend any particular result.  
Many permutations of a new guideline for financial 
reporting fraud would be possible and more rational than 
the current scheme.147  My point is simply that some 
significant revisions, both downward and in reduced 
double-counting, are necessary to get the Guidelines back 
on the rails.  At present, virtually every case that comes 
along involves nonsensical results such as thirty years of 
imprisonment or life without parole. 
 
iv. In the new guideline, include existing enhancements for 
endangering the solvency or security of the company and 
for leadership role in the offense, as well as existing 
reductions for minor role in the offense.148  Abandon 
 
 147 Without fully opening the debate on severity, it is fair to say that the prevailing view, at 
least among academics, is that deterrent and retributive aims can best be satisfied with white 
collar crime by sentences that are relatively short but that include imprisonment and the high 
probability of its imposition.  See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 35, at 739-40; see also Stephen Breyer, 
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 20 (1988) (“short but certain terms of confinement for many white-collar 
offenders” was objective of Guidelines project at inception).  For an alternative proposed loss 
table (with only six levels ranging from $10,000 to $100 million), see Bowman, III, supra note 
35, at 330.  
 148 See Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 508-09 (noting draconian effect of applying entire loss 
amount in accounting fraud to defendant who participated in scheme only in late stages); see also 
United States v. Brown, 459 F.3d 509, 531 (5th Cir. 2006) (reversing convictions of investment 
bankers for aiding accounting fraud at Enron on basis of participation in one relatively small 
transaction that enabled Enron to meet earnings targets in a single quarter). 
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enhancements that either apply to all cases of financial 
reporting fraud or would double-count because they are 
captured by other enhancements or by the loss calculation: 
Use of “sophisticated means”; large number of victims; and 
the defendant’s status as an officer or director of a public 
company.149 
 
V.     AVENUES FOR REFORM 
 
Three institutions have the power to remedy the law’s deficiencies 
concerning sentencing for financial reporting fraud: Congress, the 
United States Sentencing Commission and the federal courts.150  All 
three can and should act. 
Congress has the most power and its involvement would address 
the problem most directly.  The Sentencing Commission and Guidelines 
are creatures of legislative delegation.  Congress retains the authority, 
within constitutional constraints, to reshape them at virtually any level 
of generality.  Congress could enact a new guideline governing financial 
reporting fraud or, consistent with past practice, direct the Commission 
to develop a new guideline and provide parameters or policy objectives 
to steer that project.  About the only relevant thing Congress could not 
do is generate a judge-applied guideline that would be mandatory 
(because that would be unconstitutional).151 
Of course, anyone with passing familiarity with the history of 
federal sentencing law knows that the preceding paragraph is pie in the 
sky.  Congress rarely gets involved in sentencing law at the level of 
specific Guidelines provisions; it generally does so only in connection 
with “tough on crime” focal points, like the cocaine-to-crack weight 
 
 149 See Bowman, III, supra note 35, at 333 (“what the Guidelines have done over time is to 
tease out many of the factors for which loss was already a rough proxy and give them 
independent weight in the offense level calculus.”).  For those interested in the bottom line, 
following this reform example would have led to approximately the following sentences: For 
COO, CFO and CAO in our Acme example, four and a half and five and a half years’ 
imprisonment respectively; for James Olis (the Dynegy official), perhaps five years’ 
imprisonment; and for former Worldcom CEO Bernard Ebbers and former Enron CEO Jeffrey 
Skilling, perhaps fifteen years’ imprisonment. 
 150 I exclude the United States Department of Justice because, while it certainly has the power 
to direct its prosecutors to recommend non-Guidelines sentences (even pursuant to an express 
policy that might adopt an approach like the one I recommend), that is not the way sentencing 
reform is meant to work.  The Department is supposed to advocate for enforcement of existing 
law, while lobbying for changes in that law when needed.  The Department has a remarkably 
successful record when seeking changes in sentencing law, before both Congress and the 
Sentencing Commission.  Its proper role here would be to participate in revising the law by 
expressing its support for needed changes to Congress and the Commission. 
 151 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
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ratio under the narcotics guidelines.152  Congress has never intervened 
in the Guidelines process in order to lessen the severity of sentences. 
Fortunately, the Sentencing Commission has power to act in 
response to the problem of punishment for financial fraud.  Contrary to 
what many may believe (including apparently at least one federal 
appeals court),153 the current Guidelines governing financial reporting 
fraud are not the result of any congressional mandate, including 
Sarbanes-Oxley.  Much of the unreasonableness of the Guidelines 
results from the failure to appreciate their application to large cases of 
accounting fraud during the process of revision in 2001, which was a 
reform effort initiated by the Commission not Congress.154  To the 
extent Sarbanes-Oxley led to further severity, it was not inevitable: The 
Act’s directives to the Commission dictate review and revision, not any 
particular result.155  A conclusion that special provisions are needed for 
cases of financial reporting fraud could hardly be deemed unreasonable 
given that so many cases now come out at life imprisonment, the most 
severe punishment short of death, and that Congress intended the 
majority of the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation as a response to the specific 
problem of financial reporting fraud.156  In any event, Congress would 
be much less likely to question the Commission’s work in this area now 
than it might have been during the heated period just after the collapse 
of Enron and Worldcom. 
What if the Sentencing Commission fails to act or takes so long to 
act that many of the current cases of financial reporting fraud cannot 
 
 152 See NORMAN ABRAMS & SARA SUN BEALE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS 
ENFORCEMENT 365 (5th ed. 2005). 
 153 See United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 154 See Bowman, III, supra note 131, at 387-91. 
 155 Section 905 of the Act provides, in part: 
[T]he Sentencing Commission shall (1) ensure that the sentencing guidelines and 
policy statements reflect the serious nature of the offenses and the penalties set forth in 
this Act, the growing incidence of serious fraud offenses which are identified above, 
and the need to modify the sentencing guidelines and policy statements to deter, 
prevent, and punish such offenses; [and] (2) consider the extent to which the guidelines 
and policy statements adequately address whether the guideline offense levels and 
enhancements for violation of the sections amended by this Act are sufficient to deter 
and punish such offenses, and specifically, are adequate in view of the statutory 
increases in penalties contained in this Act. 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 905, 116 Stat. 745, 746 (2002).  Section 
1104 of the Act provides, in part: 
[T]he United States Sentencing Commission is requested to . . . promptly review the 
sentencing guidelines applicable to securities and accounting fraud and related 
offenses . . . .  In carrying out this section, the Sentencing Commission is requested 
to . . . ensure that the sentencing guidelines and policy statements reflect the serious 
nature of securities, pension, and accounting fraud and the need for aggressive and 
appropriate law enforcement action to prevent such offenses. 
Id. § 1104; see also Bowman, III, supra note 131, at 412 (arguing that language of Sarbanes-
Oxley did not require the Commission to alter the Guidelines as it did). 
 156 See Bowman, III, supra note 131, at 413. 
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benefit from its efforts?  Federal judges are not bound to apply the 
existing Guidelines given the Supreme Court’s ruling that mandatory, 
judicially applied guidelines are unconstitutional.157  Federal judges still 
must follow statutory directives to consult the Guidelines and consider 
what form and quantity of punishment are necessary to achieve 
objectives of retribution and deterrence.158  Their sentences are still 
subject to appellate review for “reasonableness.”159  But faithful 
adherence to these requirements would push sentences in cases of 
financial reporting fraud away from the bottom-line results under 
current economic crime guidelines, not toward them. 
Judicial action on this problem need not lead to haphazard 
sentencing, even though the courts are moving in that direction.  The 
primary virtue of non-binding guidelines, as in the current post-Booker 
environment, is that they provide a focal point and coordination device 
that reduces the inequality and randomness that can result when 
hundreds of judges in hundreds of cases impose criminal sentences 
based only on their individual preferences.  While not as effective as 
centrally promulgated guidelines, judicial opinions can also be effective 
coordination devices.  All it would take is for a single judge to issue a 
persuasive opinion, setting forth a rigorous and reasonable loss-based 
methodology for sentencing accounting fraud defendants, for another 
judge to follow the approach, and so on.  While judges might vary in 
their views on how harshly to punish white-collar crime, few if any can 
believe that irrationality, chance and lack of proportionality are 
desirable objectives for a sentencing system.  There is ample incentive 
and adequate means for district court judges collectively to take action. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
My target has been narrow, but it could hardly be more pressing.  
No topic in the torrent of public discussion that has followed from the 
collapse of the Enron Corporation, and other recent market 
developments, is more important than the decision whether to revoke 
the liberty of a former corporate executive for years, decades or even 
life.  It is inexcusable that there should be bald and easily remedied 
deficiencies in the law governing this decision and that those 
deficiencies should persist even as case after significant case comes 
before the courts for sentencing.  Congress, the Sentencing Commission 
and the courts should get on with the business of repair by adopting and 
 
 157 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 243-44 (2005). 
 158 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2006). 
 159 See Booker, 543 U.S. at 260-64. 
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applying a systematic methodology for calculating loss and punishment 
in cases of financial reporting fraud that advances objectives of 
proportionality and rationality. 
